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Abstract 
 
This paper re-examines Kurt Lewin’s classic leadership studies, using them as a concrete 
example to explore his wider legacy to social psychology. Lewin distinguished between 
advanced “Galileian” science, which was based on analysing particular examples, and 
backward “Aristotelian” science, which used statistical analyses. Close examination of the 
way Lewin wrote about the leadership studies reveals that he used the sort of binary, value-
laden concepts that he criticised as “Aristotelian”. Such concepts, especially those of 
“democracy” and “autocracy”, affected the way that he analysed the results and the ways that 
later social scientists have understood, and misunderstood, the studies. It is argued that 
Lewin’s famous motto – “there is nothing as practical as a good theory” – is too simple to fit 
the tensions between the leadership studies and his own views of what counts as good theory. 
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Kurt Lewin is often depicted as a mythic figure in the history of social psychology: the 
textbooks typically describe him as the founding father of experimental social psychology, a 
genius whose life was tragically cut short. Like many mythic figures, Lewin symbolically 
seems to unite contradictory elements. His famous motto – “there is nothing as practical as a 
good theory” - appears to unite theory and practice within the orbit of experimental 
methodology. When social psychologists quote the motto, as they regularly do, it is as if 
Lewin had demonstrated the essential harmony between theory, practice and experimental 
methodology. Rather than taking the myths and the motto at face value, the present study 
examines contradictions within Lewin’s work, as well as contradictions between his work 
and the later mythology. It does so by re-examining Lewin’s classic study on leadership, 
which has been described as the most widely cited study in the history of leadership research 
and “the benchmark” study of its time (Ledlow and Coppola, 2011, p. 62). Lewin’s 
leadership study will be specifically re-examined in the light of Lewin’s ideas about what 
constitutes a good theory. It will be argued that the study diverged in significant ways from 
Lewin’s own philosophy about the practice of good research and the formulation of good 
theory. 
The initial leadership study was conducted in 1938 at Iowa University by Ronald 
Lippitt, a graduate student supervised by Kurt Lewin. Two groups of eleven year-old 
children, mainly boys, participated after school in mask-making groups, meeting over a 
number of weeks. With one group, Lippitt acted as a “democratic” leader while with the other 
he acted as an “authoritarian” leader. There were trained observers noting how the children 
behaved in the various group sessions. Lewin and Lippitt (1938) reported the initial results 
and Lippitt (1940) wrote up the findings in detail. Ralph White joined Lippitt to run the 
second experiment also under Lewin’s direction. They used the same basic procedure but in a 
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more complex design.  This time, there were four groups (all boys) and four different leaders, 
as well as a third leadership style – the laissez-faire style. Each group experienced more than 
one leader and more than one leadership style. Lewin, Lippitt and White (1999/1939) 
combined the results from the two experiments. The combined results were also reported by 
Lippitt and White (1958), while White and Lippitt (1960) in their book Autocracy and 
Democracy discussed in greater detail and with less formality the conduct, history and 
findings of both experiments. Lewin frequently referred to the results of the studies in his 
technical writings (e.g., Lewin, 1946/1997 and 1947/1997) and in his writings addressed to 
non-specialists (Lewin, 1948, chapters three and five).  
Recently a number of social psychologists have been re-examining classic 
experimental studies in social psychology. Reicher and Haslam (2011) have referred to the 
“shock of the old”, because those, who are re-examining the classics, are overturning long 
accepted views (e.g., Cherry, 1995; Gibson, 2013; Manning, Levine and Collins, 2007; Perry, 
2013; Reicher and Haslam, 2006; Russell, 2011; Smith and Haslam, 2012). Some like Gibson 
(2013) and Perry (2013) are using archival sources to suggest that what “really” happened 
was rather different what the original authors said had happened. Others are using current 
theories of social behaviour, rather than archival sources, to overturn classic interpretations. 
For instance, Haslam and Reicher (2012) argue that if one applies modern ideas about 
leadership and social identity to the famous Stanford prison experiment, then there are good 
reasons for doubting Zimbardo’s interpretations of his results.  
This present re-examination of Lewin’s leadership study resembles these revisionist 
studies because it will suggest that some of Lewin’s descriptions of the study, as well as 
many later accounts, inadequately depict what occurred. It will also be argued that Lewin’s 
interpretations often lacked the subtlety that one would expect from modern analyses of talk 
and discourse. However, the primary aim is not to re-visit this classic study as an end in itself 
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in order to put the historical record right. There is the wider aim of examining the 
discrepancy between Lewin’s research philosophy and his research practice – a discrepancy 
that is regularly overlooked by those who mythologize Lewin. 
This means taking seriously Lewin’s philosophy of science, especially his distinction 
between Aristotelian and Galileian science which he took from his teacher, the philosopher 
Ernst Cassirer. It is appropriate to take Lewin’s philosophy seriously because he was not the 
sort of experimental psychologist who is quick to dismiss the demands of philosophy. His 
biographer and friend Alfred Marrow quoted Kurt’s second wife, Gertrud, as saying that 
Lewin “never abandoned philosophy” (Marrow, 1969, p. 17). The problem is the 
contradiction between his philosophy and his research. Lewin might have philosophically 
equated good theory with Galileian science, but his own research practice remained 
obstinately stuck in the sort of Aristotelian mode that he considered to be scientifically 
unsatisfactory. 
This will be illustrated by considering the leadership studies as a case history of 
Lewin’s research practices. This is appropriate because, as will be seen, Lewin recommended 
that social scientists should explore single cases in detail, rather than collect repeated 
examples. Indeed, Lewin’s methodological views might surprise those experimental social 
psychologists, who consider him to be the founding father of their discipline and who assume 
that he must have championed the sorts of experimental methods that have become dominant 
within the discipline. Lewin’s views on methodology might also surprise some critical 
psychologists, who also assume that he must have been a conventional experimentalist. 
However, according to Kurt Danziger (1994), Lewin’s methodological legacy remains 
“something of a buried treasure” (p. 178). 
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Lewin’s views on methodology were not based on personal preference, as if he 
enjoyed doing one type of research more than another. His views on methodology were part 
of his wider philosophy, and followed from his distinction between Galileian and Aristotelian 
science. So were his views about the sorts of concepts that psychologists should be using and 
those that they should avoid. As we shall see, Lewin distinguished between Aristotelian and 
Galileian concepts. In examining the leadership study, it will be argued that Lewin, by his 
choice and use of concepts, wrote in ways that were at variance with his Galileian ideals. 
The intention is not merely to point out these contradictions, but also to examine more 
generally Lewin’s use of language in the conduct of the leadership studies. In particular, the 
paper critically explores how Lewin’s choice of concepts, especially the key terms 
“democratic” and “autocratic”, affected the way that he and his collaborators understood, 
analysed and presented their results. In doing this, the paper offers a rhetorical analysis of the 
language used by Lewin and his co-workers. In this context the notion of “rhetoric” refers to 
the use of persuasive language. Since academic writers seek to persuade their readers, it is 
inevitable that they use rhetorical language, although they might not be aware of the 
implications of their own writing practices. Accordingly the critical study of academic 
discourse, and especially rhetorical conventions, should be considered as important as the 
analysis of theory and methodology in the social sciences (Billig, 2011 and 2013; Hyland, 
2009; Nelson, Megill and McCloskey, 1987). This is why the present paper focuses on 
examining the language and rhetorical strategies that Lewin and his co-workers used to 
describe and explain their results, rather than seeking to compare those descriptions and 
explanations with archival information. 
Inevitably this emphasis upon analysing rhetoric involves an approach which differs 
from Lewin’s. The sort of “good” theory that Lewin advocated was designed to reveal the 
psychological forces that supposedly lay behind linguistic behaviour; he was less concerned 
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with systematically analysing how people actually use language in their social world. 
Lewin’s own Galileian approach, it will be suggested, was not well-suited for examining the 
discursive behaviour of the participants in the leadership studies; nor was it conducive to 
producing the sort of self-critical analyses that Lewin himself advocated in theory but did not 
fulfil, at least in relation to his own rhetorical practices. If the end result of this analytic 
strategy is that the leadership studies and the rhetorical practices of their authors are 
criticised, then it should be emphasised that the present intention is not to dismiss Lewin and 
his contribution to the social sciences. Rather, the wider aim is to rescue his work from the 
sort of uncritical mythologizing that currently surrounds it.  
 
Aristotelian and Galileian Science 
If Lewin believed that a good theory was inherently practical, then throughout his career he 
sought to distinguish what marked good psychological theory from second-rate theory. At the 
heart of Lewin’s thinking about science was Cassirer’s distinction between out-dated 
Aristotelian science and advanced Galileian science (Lewin, 1931/1999, 1947/1997 and 
1949/1999; Ash, 1998, chapter sixteen; see also Hammersley, 2010, for a valuable discussion 
of the distinction between Galileian and Aristotelian science in relation to induction and the 
social sciences). Lewin believed that the psychology of his time was, in the main, stuck in the 
Aristotelian stage. It may surprise many social psychologists today to discover that some of 
the characteristics, which Lewin identified as typifying backward Aristotelian psychology, 
are those which predominate in modern experimental social psychology. Equally, it may 
surprise students of Cassirer’s work that Lewin ignored Cassirer’s writings on psychology, 
where the great philosopher, citing Gestaltist ideas, stressed the importance of seeing humans 
as symbol-using and symbol-creating beings (e.g. Cassirer, 1944/1962; see also Cassirer, 
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1999, and Carini, 1973). Lewin was aware that in drawing upon Cassirer, he was avoiding 
Cassirer’s “treatment of specific problems of psychology” (Lewin (1949/1999, p. 23). 
Consequently, Lewin used a very much reduced version of Cassirer’s philosophy. He took 
Cassirer’s idealized image of physics, based on Galileo’s work and the possibility of 
producing mathematical laws, as an ideal for all sciences, including the human sciences. This 
meant ignoring Cassirer’s arguments that a different sort of understanding was required for 
human and psychological sciences – an understanding, which cannot be mathematized and 
which Cassirer in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (1932/1951) linked to Diderot and 
the third earl of Shaftesbury (see Billig, 2008, for an appreciation of Shaftesbury’s dialogical 
view of the mind and its potential importance for critical psychologists). 
Lewin, in distinguishing between Aristotelian and Galileian sciences, argued for the 
superiority of the latter over the former. He claimed that Aristotelian science was 
probabilistic and was based on statistical generalities, not on exact laws. In fact, Lewin 
decried the use of statistics in psychology. He argued that psychologists and other social 
scientists should study in detail “concrete, individual cases” from which general laws could 
be derived (1938a, p. 285). In an article written jointly with his long-term friend, the notable 
Marxist theorist Karl Korsch, Lewin suggested that the prerequisite for the new sort of 
scientific psychological and sociological investigation was that “the individual event” needed 
to be considered “in its particular setting” (Lewin and Korsch, 1939, p. 401). Regarding 
psychological experiments this meant abandoning the usual procedure of collecting numerous 
instances of experimental conditions and then statistically comparing the mean scores of the 
subjects in the different conditions. According to Lewin (1938a), if one seriously seeks to 
understand the concrete individual case, then “the results of individual experiments cannot be 
submitted to statistical treatment where the assumption prevails that preceding and 
succeeding trials are identical in kind”; instead, “each trial must be treated as a separate, 
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concrete event, i.e. in an essentially non-statistical way” (p. 284, emphasis in original). This 
principle applied both to experimental studies of individuals and of groups, as well as broader 
sociological studies. 
Good theory, then, was not to be based upon statistically analysed results from 
experimental samples, but on the detailed study of particular cases. It was, in Lewin’s view, 
important to understand the underlying forces behind outward behaviour. To comply with the 
principles of Galileian science, such forces should be expressed in mathematical terms and, in 
consequence, psychologists should use mathematics to express qualitative, not quantitative, 
differences (1944/1997). Lewin believed that field theory succeeded in formulating 
topological formulae to represent the forces in a person’s situation, or life space, which led 
them to behave as they did (Lewin, 1936 and 1938b). The methodological implication was 
clear: an experiment, involving the detailed study of a single concrete case, was more 
valuable than one permitting large amounts of data to be gathered from quickly and 
superficially studied participants.  
Lewin argued that Galileian and Aristotelian sciences not only used different methods 
but they used different concepts. In Lewin’s view, Aristotelian concepts were marked by two 
characteristics: they had a “valuative character” and they were binary (1931/1999, p. 38). 
Lewin suggested that most psychologists used “anthropomorphic” or Aristotelian concepts 
that expressed values, such as the value-laden concepts “normal” and “pathological” 
behaviour which clinical psychologists use (pp. 38-9). Concepts such as “normal” and 
“pathological” were also binary since they represented “paired opposites”, unlike Galileian 
concepts that expressed “continuous gradations” (p. 39). By using neutral, non-binary 
concepts such as “forces” and “vectors”, Lewin believed that field theory represented an 
advance over ordinary value judgement. Generally, Lewin disparaged psychologists for using 
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the binary, value-laden of everyday language. If psychologists were to use ordinary language 
concepts, then they should redefine them in specialist, technical ways (1944/1997, p. 192).  
This contrast between “good” Galileian and “bad” Aristotelian concepts leads to a 
problem between the demands of producing good theory and being practical. To be good 
theorists, psychologists needed to write in technical ways, using concepts that non-specialists 
would have difficulty grasping. However, to be practically useful, psychologists must be able 
to communicate with non-specialist audiences. Throughout his career Lewin sought to 
communicate with wider audiences, from his early article on applied psychology published in 
Korsch’s Marxist journal Praktischer Sozialismus (Practical Socialism) to his final writings 
addressed to educational and Jewish community leaders (Lewin, 1921/1999 and 1948, 
especially Part III; see also John, Eckardt and Hiebsch, 1989). The leadership studies were 
caught within this continuing dilemma between good and practical science. 
 
Using Aristotelian concepts in the leadership studies: the independent variables 
Lewin and his co-workers labelled the two main independent variables of the leadership 
studies with ordinary language concepts that were binary opposites: “democracy” and 
“autocracy”. Inevitably, these terms are inherently political and value-laden. Lewin was, of 
course, a refugee from an anti-democratic, autocratic regime and his writings about social 
conflict reflected his deep concern with the dangers of fascism and the need to establish 
democratic principles in practice (Lewin, 1948). He argued that the leadership studies carried 
wider social messages about political culture and leadership (Lewin, 1948, chapters three and 
five). 
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In their research reports Lewin and his team, used “democracy”, “democratic 
atmosphere” and “democratic style of leadership” interchangeably, as they did 
“authoritarian” and “autocratic”. These terms rested on the value-laden contrast between 
autocracy/authoritarianism and democracy. Moreover, by using “democracy” interchangeably 
with terms such as “democratic atmosphere” and “democratic style of leadership” they were 
assuming that the democratic atmospheres and styles, that they were observing, were actually 
democratic, rather than being democratic appearances that hid non-democratic realities.  In 
the second experiment, Lewin and his co-workers introduced the concept of “laissez-faire” 
and, as we shall see, they did this to preserve the basic ideological values of the study.  
White and Lippitt (1960) wrote that early in their discussions of the leadership roles, 
they found themselves using ordinary language terms to describe these roles. Rather than 
calling them “role one”, “role two” and “role three”, as might have been scientifically correct, 
it seemed “natural and appropriate to us” to give them the names “autocratic”, “democratic” 
and “laissez-faire” (p. 10). The comment is interesting. It shows the extent to which the 
researchers took their everyday understandings and values into the research programme, 
rather than deriving their key concepts from psychological theories. It also indicates the 
ideological nature of their everyday assumptions. Some researchers claim that “ideology” 
represents the processes by which people come to accept their social world as being 
“natural”. If the researchers considered it “natural” to use political terms such as “autocratic” 
and “democratic” (and we will see that “laissez-faire” has a different history within the 
research project), then the researchers, in acting as researchers, were themselves engaged in 
ideological actions in the sense that they were accepting conventional political language as 
being “natural”.  
Lewin and Korsch (1939) stressed that when social psychologists seek to study group 
processes, they must take account of “the existing ‘ideologies’ of the groups concerned” (p. 
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401). The group leaders were in what Lewin (1938b) termed an “overlapping situation”: they 
were simultaneously part of the life of the groups by virtue of their roles as leaders, and also 
they were acting as researchers, belonging to the group of researchers. Lewin and Korsch’s 
dictum should require them to be self-analytical about their own existing ideologies and 
about the possible effects of those ideologies on their behaviour as both group leaders and 
researchers. This would mean critically examining their use of terminology such as 
“democracy” and “autocracy”, let alone “democratic atmosphere” or “style”. 
Instead, the researchers tend to take for granted – or treat as “natural” - that the 
phenomena which they were studying should be called “democracy” and “autocracy”. The 
way that the researchers operationalised these concepts has been criticised and it is not 
intended to discuss these criticisms here (see Gastil, 1994). The researchers used 
understandable guidelines. For instance, in autocratic groups the leader “usually dictated the 
particular work task and work companions of each member” while in democratic groups “the 
members were free to work with whomever they chose and the division of tasks was left up 
to the group”; in autocratic groups “all determination of policy” was by the leader, while in 
the democratic groups all policies were “a matter of group discussion and decision” (Lewin et 
al, 1939/1999, p. 229).  
In practice matters were not quite so clear-cut. The policy to have a leader and to 
make masks was not decided democratically in the democratic groups, nor was the actual 
democratic leader chosen by the group members. The leaders in the democratic groups would 
typically decide which matters were for discussion and group decision and which were not. If 
this was a “democracy”, it was a very limited democracy, for power firmly resided in the 
hands of the adult leaders, who controlled what decisions were to be delegated to the group 
members. Indeed, many school teachers nowadays involve children in classroom discussions, 
rather than issuing outright commends, but that does not mean that their classrooms should be 
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called “democracies” for the teachers retain power even if they exercise this power subtly 
(Edwards and Mercer, 1987). 
Above all, the leaders were responsible for running the experiment. They had to 
ensure that they created recognizably “democratic” and “authoritarian” conditions. This led to 
a paradox: sometimes democratic leaders were more controlling than authoritarian leaders 
when they sought to control what they considered to be undemocratic behaviour. In one 
episode the leader is trying to ensure open discussion but one of the boys is struggling to be 
heard. The leader, using the “democratic style” of command, in which “we” is used to 
indicate “you”, says: “We ought to listen to what Hamil has to say and take our turns” (White 
and Lippitt, 1960, p. 102). The leader here is telling the children how to behave. 
By contrast, the autocratic leaders could not be too autocratic, because, in order to be 
successful experimenters, they had to permit the children to behave freely. Autocratic leaders 
might issue orders, but they could not insist upon those orders being obeyed, without the risk 
of affecting the experimental results. Given that “autocracy” was the “bad” independent 
variable, as contrasted with the “good” variable of democracy, it was in the interests of the 
experimenters to let the participants behave badly in the autocratic groups. Lippitt (1940) 
reports on the children yelling hysterically and ignoring the autocratic leader, who displays 
“exaggerated patience” and merely stares at the offenders without saying anything (p. 86). 
Moreover, the autocratic leaders possessed no punitive powers. Unlike even the mildest of 
teachers, these autocrats could not discipline the children. At most they could have excluded 
recalcitrant children from the group, but this would have threatened the experimental design. 
In short, they were autocrats without autocratic powers. 
The researchers in their various reports reproduce some of the observers’ notes but 
they do not analyse particular episodes, or interactions, in any concrete detail. A modern 
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discursive psychologist might pay close attention to particular episodes, analysing how the 
participants interacted and used language. In doing this, they would be fulfilling Lewin’s 
demand to analyse concrete particulars. Moreover, they would be taking a critical stance 
towards the use of the terms “autocratic” and “democratic”. Instead of accepting these terms 
at face value, the analyst would be examining how in practice an autocratic leader or 
democratic leader actually exercised powers of leadership in their interactions within the 
groups and how they used the terms “autocratic” and “democratic” in conversations with 
fellow researchers. 
Lewin advocated a critical stance: we should treat scientists, he suggested, in the same 
way as we treat government – with “a great deal of distrust and an eternal vigilance against 
an overextension of power” (1943/1999, p. 336). Lewin (1943/1999) suggested that 
psychologists, when trying to understand utterances, need to look beyond grammatical form 
to the “social meaning” of utterances. For example if a teacher or nazi said “Would you close 
the door?” they would be uttering a command, rather than asking a question. In trying to be 
“objective”, most psychologists, according to Lewin, would typically ignore the “social 
meaning” of such an utterance and would classify it as a question purely on the basis of its 
grammatical form (p. 340).  
It is arguable whether the researchers in the leadership study followed this critical 
stance fully, which looks beyond the grammatical form of an utterance to its social function. 
Lippitt (1940) and White and Lippitt (1960) gave examples of democratic leaders supposedly 
opening up decisions for democratic discussion rather than giving orders. Many of the 
examples were of the type: “‘Would you like me to give you a little idea of how they 
generally make masks?’ (All nod)” (Lippitt, 1940 p. 77); or “Don’t you think it would be a 
good idea if we tackled one at a time?” (p. 111). These directed questions resemble those that 
Edwards and Mercer (1987) discovered liberal teachers using as a means of exercising 
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control without explicitly giving orders. These questions contain what conversation analysts 
have called a “preference structure” for agreement, such that agreement is invited and 
disagreement can be problematic (Pomerantz, 1984; Lerner, 1996). The leader, in effect, was 
inviting the children to agree – to “nod” is easy but to disagree is more complicated and 
potentially awkward. Disagreeing would have put the child in a position where they would 
have had to justify their disagreement and thereby expose themselves to criticism from the 
adult leader. Lewin and his collaborators did not view these “questions” as means by which 
leaders can exert social control, but viewed them as genuine questions, asked in a democratic 
spirit. Of course, Lewin should not be criticised for failing to anticipate later investigations 
into conversational meaning, but he can be criticised for being partial in his critique. He 
warned against taking authoritarian autocrats at their grammatical word, whilst uncritically 
accepting similar forms of wording from “democratic” authorities. It was as if the category 
“democratic” offered protection from criticism. 
 
Using Aristotelian terminology: the origins of “laissez-faire” 
Anyone reading Lewin et al (1939/1999) would get the impression that the researchers 
intended from the outset that the second experiment should have an extra condition - laissez-
faire leadership. The authors followed the convention of report-writing by using the passive 
voice when describing the procedures of the second experiment: “Four new clubs of 10-year-
old boys were organized...the variety of clubs was extended...To the variable of authoritarian 
and democratic procedures was added a third, ‘laissez-faire’” (p. 227, italics in original; see 
Biber and Conrad, 2009; Billig, 2011 and 2013; Billig and Marinho, in press, for discussions 
of the use of the passive voice in methods sections). The phrasing conveys that the order of 
events followed the structure of the research report: the idea for the design preceded the 
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running of the experiment, which preceded the collection of data, which preceded the 
analysis (Swales, 2006). But this was not so. 
We are fortunate to have three further, less formal accounts of the second experiment 
and its history: the book by White and Lippitt (1960), Miriam Lewin’s memoir of her father 
(M. Lewin 1998) and Marrow’s (1969) biography of Lewin. Apparently the experimenters 
initially decided that the second study, like the first, would compare democratic and 
authoritarian styles of leadership. They soon became aware that the children in White’s group 
were not behaving as expected in the democratic condition: the atmosphere of the group “had 
become so anarchic, and the leader so generally ignored” that the group was not functioning 
as “a well-integrated democracy” (White and Lippitt, 1960, p. 110).  
The group – the Charlie Chan Group - seemed to have more than its fair share of 
boys, whom Lippitt and White found problematic. According to the researchers, the group 
contained “three outstanding trouble makers”, including one boy who was “more definitely a 
disciplinary problem” than any of the other boys in the whole study (White and Lippitt, 1960, 
p. 107). According to White and Lippitt (1960), the two most disrespectful boys of the 
Charlie Chan group “made democracy harder to achieve” and were “a net liability from the 
standpoint of democracy” (p. 174). 
The problem was not that these boys were anti-democratic but in one sense they were 
too democratic. These difficult boys did not treat adults with respect but treated them “as 
equals” showing “indifference to adult-sponsored values” (Lippitt and White, 1958, p. 509). 
White and Lippitt (1960) gave an example of ‘Reilly’, the most problematic boy, interrupting 
and contradicting the leader, “talking to him as a peer” (p. 107). Lippitt and White did not 
appreciate being treated like this. Their dislike is clear, especially their dislike of ‘Reilly’ 
(Lippitt and White, 1958, pp. 508f; White and Lippitt, 1960, pp. 175f). In the autocratic 
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condition, Reilly led an outright rebellion, mobilizing the other boys into a strike. The 
researchers did not go into details about the episode, which, if successful, would have 
threatened the design of the experiment but would have provided a concrete example of how 
autocracy could be resisted.  
Lippitt and White (1958) dismissed Reilly’s capabilities as a leader, claiming “he was 
not actually a leader in the sense that he showed any planning or organizing ability”; he was 
only a leader in that his “headlong, self-centred activity was imitated by others in the group” 
and he was successful in getting “gullible” boys to accept him “at his own valuation” (pp. 
508-9). Lewin et al (1939/1999) report that the rebellion failed when the boys’ courage 
“seemed to wane” (p. 241). In all such comments, the ideology of the researchers is clear: 
they were not favouring rebellion against authority in this situation, and disapproved of the 
boys treating the adult leaders with too much equality. When this occurred, the researchers 
considered that democracy was being threatened.  
Lippitt and White feared that the behaviour of this group in the democratic condition 
was threatening the success of the experiment, because democracy did not seem to be 
emerging well. Apparently Lewin saved the day. He suggested that White had been allowing 
the boys too much freedom and that his leadership should not be called “democratic” but 
“laissez-faire”. The team decided to build White’s style into the experimental design by 
running further laissez-faire groups. This story of looming disaster and rescue by the “laissez-
faire” label does not appear in the journal reports.  Nor did Lewin mention the story in his 
various summaries of the second experiment (e.g., Lewin, 1948, chapters three and five). The 
official version has become part of disciplinary folklore, with the textbooks presenting the 
laissez-faire condition as if it had been planned in advance (e.g., Hergenhahn and Henley, 
2013, p. 459; Nelson and Quick, 2011, p. 434).  
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Whatever the methodological proprieties of such relabeling, we can ask about the 
rhetorical consequences of creating a new condition in this way. Basically, Lewin’s rhetorical 
switch served to protect the reputation of “democracy”. Bad results accruing to “democracy” 
would have created an ideological problem. Lewin’s solution was Aristotelian, not Galileian, 
for he did not treat “democratic leadership” as if were a continuous, rather than a binary, 
concept. For example, he might have classified White’s style of “democratic leadership” as 
being at the far end of a democratic continuum with a more interventionist style at the other 
end. To have seen “democracy” in this Galileian way would have meant classifying the 
problematic behaviour of the Charlie Chan group as being produced by an extreme form of 
“democratic leadership”. The problem is avoided by treating “democracy” as a binary 
concept, so that White’s style ceases to be an instance of democratic leadership. Thus, Lewin 
protected the concept of “democracy” rhetorically, attributing the bad results to a form of 
non-democratic leadership. 
 
Ensuring the results make a good story 
The researchers performed a further act of rhetorical labelling to transform unfavourable 
results into favourable ones. In the mythology of the experiment, it is commonly asserted that 
the study demonstrated that autocratic groups were more aggressive than democratic ones. 
Statements to this effect can be found in social psychology textbooks, histories of 
psychology, organizational books and research reports: “in contrast to children in democratic 
groups, those in authoritarian groups expressed 30 times as much hostility” (Barone, 
Madddux and Snyder, 1997, p. 33); with the autocratic leaders “there was more aggression” 
(Brown, 2000, p. 94); “the authoritarian group was highly aggressive” (Hergenhahn and 
Henley, 2013, p.459); the researchers noted “high rates of hostility in the autocratically led 
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groups” (Forsyth, 2009, p. 43); “the studies revealed that there was more aggression (about 
30 times more) and more scapegoating in authoritarian led groups” (Macgowan and Wagner, 
2005, p. 84). 
These comments imply that mean measures of aggression were computed and 
compared across conditions. This is not a matter of later social psychologists interpreting 
Galileian, non-averaged data in a conventional Aristotelian style. Lewin et al (1939/1999) 
presented a table showing the average number of aggressive actions per meeting in the 
different leadership conditions (p. 237). Actually, they do not present a single score for 
“autocracy” but they give two autocratic scores. Had they offered a single score, the mean 
would have been 7.5, which would have been by far the lowest level of aggression for any of 
the three conditions: the mean for laissez-faire was 38 and for democracy 20. Instead, the 
authors divided the autocracy condition into the two most aggressive autocracy groups 
(whose average was 30) and the four least aggressive autocracy groups (average 2). 
Having divided the autocratic groups into two categories, the authors then needed to 
label these categories. Unsurprisingly they called the first group “aggressive autocracies” and 
presented the scores of “Autocracy (aggressive reaction)”. Their name for the second group is 
revealing. Given that the groups were being split on the basis of their aggressiveness and 
given that no other groups in the whole experiment had lower average aggression levels than 
the four least aggressive autocratic groups, one might have expected that the latter would be 
called “non-aggressive autocracies” or even “peaceful autocracies”. However, that would 
have linked autocracy with a positively valued characteristic (non-aggressiveness). Instead, 
the researchers chose a negatively valued term– “apathetic”. The non-aggressive autocratic 
groups were classified as “apathetic autocracies” and its scores were described “Autocracy 
(apathetic reaction)”.  
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Using the word “apathetic” solves the ideological problem of appearing to credit 
autocracy with a beneficial quality, while preserving the link between autocracy and the 
aggressive reaction. It was as if the non-aggressive autocratic groups were only non-
aggressive because they were too apathetic to be aggressive. However, the so-called 
“apathetic” groups behaved in ways that make the description curious. When justifying their 
use of “apathetic”, Lewin et al (1939/1999) claimed that these autocratic groups “dull” and 
“lifeless” with little joking or smiling (p. 238). However, Lippitt and White (1958) reported 
that the democratic and the apathetic groups produced the highest rates of “work-minded 
conversation” (p. 502). They wrote that it was “interesting to find nearly as high a level of 
interpersonal friendliness in the authoritarian situations as in the democratic and laissez-faire 
situations” (p. 504).  
White and Lippitt (1960) noted that many of the boys accepted autocratic leadership, 
seeing it as a necessary way of getting the job done; in these circumstances “the evidence of 
discontent among the boys was at a minimum” (p. 33) and accepting autocratic leadership 
could be combined with ‘productive group discussion’ (p. 34). The observers’ notes of a 
group supposedly showing a “submissive attitude to autocracy” record: “the free, sociable, 
joking atmosphere disappears almost completely as hard work begins” and, when working 
hard, the boys were asking plenty of work-related questions (White and Lippitt, 1960, pp. 51-
2; see also pp. 92f).  
The term “apathetic” may solve the ideological problem but it does less than justice to 
the complexity of the children’s behaviour. Perhaps it underestimates the extent to which 
accepting orders from adult authorities appeared ideologically “natural” to these 
schoolchildren. On the other hand, rhetorical simplicity is useful for creating mythology. 
Whereas some textbooks only mention the aggressive reactions of autocratic groups, others 
do say that autocratic groups were either aggressive or apathetic. Sometimes the apathy is 
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exaggerated: Schulz-Hardt and Brodbeck (2008) write that in the apathetic groups there were 
“no instances of smiling or joking” (p 285), thereby upgrading Lewin et al’s already 
exaggerated “little smiling (and) joking” (1939/1999, p. 238). One textbook even omits the 
aggressive groups entirely: “When led in an autocratic style, the boys were lethargic and 
docile” (Kardas, 2013, p. 356). When it comes to affecting the judgements of others and 
creating a disciplinary orthodoxy, there may be few things as practical as a clear moral story. 
 
The Aristotelian legacy of the leadership studies 
We have seen briefly how later social psychologists have simplified the findings of the 
leadership studies. This is by no means unique as there are other examples of research 
findings being exaggerated and oversimplified (see critiques by Berkowitz, 1971; Billig, 
2013; Cherry, 1995; Katzko, 2006). The leadership studies have been simplified into a moral 
fable, in which democracy was shown to be “good” and autocracy “bad”. It does not matter 
whether the levels of aggression are reported as being high or low under autocracy, the results 
are morally similar in that autocracy is found wanting. To use Lewin’s terminology, these 
scientific stories are told using moral concepts that are Aristotelian, not Galileian. 
Not all authors over-simplify the results to the point of distortion. Some mention the 
“bad” results of the democratic groups and the “good” ones of the autocratic groups but they 
tend to do using an interesting rhetoric that makes the ideological preferences all the more 
clear. When discussing the autocratic groups, the good points are typically mentioned first, 
followed by “but” (not “and”) or the writers will start with an “although” clause. Forsyth and 
Burnette (2005) comment that autocratic groups worked longer than democratic groups, “but 
hostility and aggression” were highest (p. 9). When Forsyth (2009) describes the study, he 
uses the “although” format: “Although these results argued in terms of the efficiency of an 
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autocratic leadership style, the observers also noted that when the leader left the room for any 
length of time, the democratically led groups kept on working, whereas the boys in the 
autocratic groups stopped working” (pp. 42-3).  
In these cases, and many others, the order of the propositions in the “but” and 
“although” statements could have been reversed – the writer could have said that “although 
the autocratic groups stopped working when the leader left the room, they had the more 
efficient rates of productivity”. Empirically both orders are permissible: scientific 
considerations, as opposed to ideological ones, do not preclude connecting the points with 
“and”, rather than “but” or “although”. However, the “good” points of the autocratic group 
typically come first, in order to be qualified, or discounted, by the “bad” points in the second 
part of the sentence. In terms of the overall story, the bad news that autocracy has good points 
must precede the good news that it has bad points, so that writers can overwhelm the former 
with the latter and give their sentences a happy ending. In this way, the little words “but” and 
“although” unobtrusively carry important ideological messages. 
The textbook summaries use ordinary language, rather than technical terminology, to 
convey what happened in the leadership studies. Some of the original reports contained 
diagrams and formulae of field theory (Lewin et al, 1939/1999; Lippitt, 1940). These tended 
to be placed after the main findings had been presented, as if the authors were moving 
textually from Aristotelian to Galilean science. When Lewin summarised the findings in 
writings aimed at a non-technical audience, he would use the findings to tell a moral tale 
without technical terminology or topological diagrams. For instance, he suggested that 
Lippitt’s studies “showed the beneficial effects which the democratic atmosphere has on the 
overt character of the member” (Lewin, 1944, p.196). Regarding the results from the second 
experiment, Lewin commented that the differences between democracy and laissez-faire 
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“were very much in favour of democracy” (1948, p. 81). Here Lewin assumes that the 
dependent variables of the study assess moral qualities. 
Lewin’s language was different when he summarised and discussed the findings in 
more technical writings, using topological representations of forces and spaces to describe 
what had happened  (e.g., Lewin, 1946/1997 and 1947/1997). It was as if he were translating 
ordinary language into a specialist language with the translation adding little, if anything, 
conceptually original. Indeed, it is possible to detect the extent to which the topological 
representations were influenced by the ideological and moral assumptions of the more 
ordinary or Aristotelian interpretations.  
Lewin (1947/1997) discussed a problem which Lewin et al (1939/1999) skirted 
around: why should some autocratic groups produce low levels of aggression and what 
distinguished them from the highly aggressive groups? Lewin answered the question by using 
complex topological formulae, representing the various forces in the situation. He suggested 
that the low outward aggression in “apathetic autocracy” did not indicate less aggression as a 
force in those groups. Instead in these groups there was greater autocratic control against 
outwardly displaying that aggression. Lewin expressed the point technically: “We are 
inclined to assume that the autocratic leadership form implies an additional force (fGr,c) which 
corresponds to the higher degree of authoritarian control and which in these situations has the 
direction against open aggression” (1947/1997, p. 316).  
Two points can be noted. The first is that the topological explanation exemplifies the 
sort of psychological explanation which Gigerenzer (2010) criticizes as tautological. Lewin 
explains the absence of outward aggression in terms of an underlying force directed against 
outward aggression. How do we know there is such a force in apathetic autocracies? Because 
there is little outward aggression. The second point is that the explanation depends on the 
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assumption that autocratic leadership implies a high degree of authoritarian control. One 
might say that this is a reasonable assumption in general. Certainly it reflected the extreme 
political autocracy from which Lewin had fortuitously escaped. However, this assumption 
scarcely reflected the reality of the autocracies in the leadership experiments. As has been 
mentioned, the authoritarian leaders possessed no punitive means to control the behaviour of 
the group members; and, in any case, any such control would have vitiated the validity of the 
experiment as an experiment.  
It is as if the ideological meaning of the concept “autocracy” determines the 
interpretation of the experimental situation. Lewin (1947/1997) presented a formula to 
express the relationship between authoritarian control and outward aggression: m + n (fPAGr,c) 
= p > (m + n)). Although exemplifying Lewin’s Galileian ambitions, the formula is 
essentially empty. Its basic meaning stems from the ordinary language, everyday meanings 
and ideological assumptions that create the situation which is to be formalised. In fact, the 
very formalization helps to protect those assumptions, since they become less visible and, 
thereby, less open to criticism. However, the formalizations can be peeled off, like an 
adhesive sticker on a parcel, without disturbing the contents of the parcel below. Recently, 
Burnes and Cooke (2013) have argued that Lewin’s field theory could be profitably revived 
but without the mathematical topology and hodology. For Lewin, this would have been 
tantamount to abandoning the ideal of good theory and settling for the second rate. The 
problem is that the so-called good theory adds far less than it promises and it can be less, not 
more, meaningful than the ordinary descriptions on which it depends.  
This also shows the unfortunate consequences of Lewin taking a very much reduced 
version of Cassirer’s philosophy. Lewin, following the ideals of Galileian science, was 
looking for the forces and vectors that supposedly underlie human behaviour, thereby treating 
humans as Galileo treated physical objects moving in space. However, Cassirer’s emphasis 
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on humans as symbol users suggests that psychologists and other social scientists should 
examine directly and in detail exactly how humans use language and symbols. Regarding the 
study of leadership styles, this would mean studying the ways that leaders, followers and 
researchers used language to produce the different group atmospheres. This would involve 
examining examples in their concrete particularity. As Lewin recognized, wider social 
meanings are realized within the details of particular instances and the particular case, when 
examined in depth, can hold the key to understanding broader patterns. 
 
Conclusions 
The preceding discussion points in a number of directions. The leadership studies bear out 
Lewin’s preference for a different sort of method than has become orthodox within social 
psychology. This suggests that Lewin’s legacy to social psychology may be more 
complicated than is conventionally assumed. Critical social psychologists might benefit from 
seriously considering Lewin’s work. Certainly, discursive psychologists, who seek to 
discover general laws of social organization by qualitatively examining particular social 
interactions, may find that Lewin was not the sort of intellectual opponent that they might 
have assumed him to be. Moreover, critical psychologists might note that Lewin and Korsch 
(1939) included historical materialism amongst the types of concrete, qualitative analyses 
which they advocated (on the relations between Lewin and Korsch, see van Elteren, 1992; 
John et al, 1989). Certainly, critical psychologists have scarcely begun to take seriously those 
aspects of Lewin’s work which the textbooks of social psychology routinely overlook (see 
Delouvée, Kalampalikis and Pétard, 2011, for an analysis of the ways that French textbooks 
depict Lewin). 
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Another conclusion is that the leadership studies failed to live up to Lewin’s own 
ideals of a Galileian science. The experimental situation, its results and interpretations were 
framed within binary, value-laden, ordinary concepts. It could not be otherwise once the 
researchers had decided to compare “democracy” with “autocracy”. The influence of those 
value-laden, highly ideological terms permeated all levels of the study, even when Lewin was 
using the supposedly neutral topological terms of field theory.  
It would not be difficult to argue that Lewin’s ideal of good theory contradicted his 
experimental practice because his conception of Galileian science sets unrealistic and 
inappropriate criteria for psychological sciences. Lewin’s contemporary, the Polish physician 
and microbiologist Ludwik Fleck, provided a much more realistic view of science. Drawing 
on his experience as a laboratory scientist, Fleck noted that medical science is not comprised 
of pure scientific concepts, but that it necessarily includes value-laden concepts such as 
“disease”, “pathology” and “illness” (Fleck, 1927/1986; Fleck, 1935/1979). Certainly, 
Fleck’s view of science is closer to modern sociological thinking about science than is 
Lewin’s adaptation of Cassirer’s philosophy, whose image of science was based on physics 
rather than medical science (Cohen and Schnelle, 1986; Löwy, 1988 and 2000). Fleck’s 
analysis implies that social scientists, who wish to be scientific, need not feel obliged to 
remove ordinary language, value-laden concepts, such as “autocracy” and “democracy”, from 
their theorising, just as medical scientists do not need to avoid concepts such as “illness” and 
“health”. 
There is no evidence that Lewin was aware of Fleck’s work or, had he known of it, 
that he would have been influenced by it. Instead of speculating about Lewin’s reactions to a 
very different image of science, we are left with a contradiction between the promise of 
harmony that his motto holds out and the example of his own work. In fact, the not so good 
sort of theory proved to be more practical, as Lewin used value-laden, ideological terms when 
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addressing practitioners. Lewin has had a profound effect on the history of social and 
organizational psychology, but the textbooks, when citing his work, avoid the neutral 
technical formulae, which he spent so much care formulating, and instead they use ordinary, 
moral language. 
Perhaps, this suggests a story of over-ambitious ideas coming down to earth in failure. 
Yet an alternative interpretation is possible, although this can only be sketched here and 
would need to be developed elsewhere. Maybe Lewin’s motto provides a vision of what 
might be possible in a society where the contradictions between theory and practice have 
already been economically and politically resolved. The concrete example of Lewin’s studies, 
and of his own life, shows that he lived his later life in a contradictory society, where 
democracy was not straightforward but there were, to quote Lewin, deep “paradoxes of 
democracy” (Lewin, 1948, p. 50). No-one who had seen Hitler democratically voted to power 
could be naive about the practical fragility and imperfections of democratic ideals in modern 
society. 
When there is a disjunction between a society’s theory and practice – between its 
values and economic realities – then good theory may not be practical. Or at least, the famous 
motto might only work in theory, offering a theoretical cover for underlying contradictions 
(Weik, 2003). Lewin did not claim to be the author of the motto: he wrote that “a 
businessman once stated that ‘there is nothing as practical as a good theory’” (Lewin, 
1943/1999, p. 336). But, would a businessperson necessarily have the same view as a social 
critic about what constitutes a good theory; and would they agree upon the sorts of idea that 
they wish to see put into practice?  
We can see from Lewin’s studies that not so good (Aristotelian) theory was more 
practical than good (Galileian) field theory. This apparent failure may be emblematic of 
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current ideology and social conditions. Lewin, by pursuing the idea of rational theory so 
rigorously, might have exposed its limitations and thereby produced a telling message for our 
times. Today entrepreneurs are constantly marketing “good” theories about leadership, 
business practices and organizational dynamics. Theories are commercially valuable 
commodities, as the line between academia and business is no longer as clear as it might 
formerly have been imagined to be. Academics are urged by their employers to become 
entrepreneurial profit-makers (Billig, 2013; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). These are not the 
conditions under which an intellectually good theory will be the most practical – that is, the 
most profitable - theory. What can be marketed most easily are slogans dressed as good 
theories or theories reduced to brand names. Lewin’s failure to make his good theories 
practical can be seen as an emblematic achievement. By his own example, Lewin constructed 
the conditions for an invaluable insight: today, there is nothing as practical as a second rate 
theory. 
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